Crew Changeover & Identity Handover
Regulatory Context: IACS UR E27 (Section 4.2.1) mandates that every user must be uniquely identified. This module outlines the procedure for the revocation of access for departing personnel and the provisioning of new identities, ensuring a continuous and secure audit trail.
In the maritime industry, the rotation of crew is a constant. However, if digital identities are not managed during these transitions, the vessel’s security posture degrades rapidly. “Account Pollution”—where dozens of old accounts remain active—is a primary target for attackers and a major “Critical Finding” during Class Surveys.
The Changeover Risk: Shared Identities
The biggest risk during a crew change is the temptation to pass over a single “Chief Eng” or “ETO” login. While this seems efficient, it creates a blind spot in the vessel’s safety management. Without unique identities, you lose the ability to verify who performed a specific action, which is a requirement for both security and insurance liability.
The “Ghost” Admin
Departing officers who retain remote access credentials (ZTNA/VPN) or hardware tokens pose a significant risk. If their home computer is compromised months later, an attacker has a direct, valid “identity” to enter your ship’s engine room.
Audit Trail Collapse
When multiple people use one ‘Admin’ account, forensic logs become legally useless. In the event of an accident, you cannot prove if a change was made by the current ETO, the one who left last week, or a remote vendor.
The Formal Handover Protocol
To satisfy E26/E27 requirements, the digital handover must be documented in the ship’s Safety Management System (SMS).
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