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MFA Implementation for Maritime OT

Regulatory Context: IACS UR E26 (Section 4.2.3) mandates Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for all untrusted or remote network connections. This module addresses the technical challenge of implementing MFA in “Offline” or high-latency maritime environments.

Passwords alone are no longer sufficient to protect critical shipboard systems. Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) adds a second layer of verification—something you know (password) and something you have (a token). However, traditional SMS-based or App-based codes often fail mid-ocean due to lack of cellular signal or VSAT latency.

The “Disconnected” Challenge

VSAT Latency Issues

Cloud-based MFA (like Microsoft Authenticator) can time out before the signal reaches the vessel, causing “Login Loops” that lock ETOs out of their own systems.

Zero-Signal Zones

Zero-Signal Zones Many OT locations, such as ship engine rooms, are RF-hostile environments due to steel structures and shielding. Even when a vessel has Wi-Fi, specific OT workstations may have no reliable cellular or wireless coverage, making smartphone-based MFA impractical or unusable.

Recommended Maritime MFA Methods

To remain compliant with E26 while ensuring operational safety, we prioritize Offline-capable MFA methods:

Method Connectivity Need Use Case
FIDO2 Hardware Keys (e.g. Yubikey) None (Offline) Best for: Admin access to Firewalls and AMS Servers.
TOTP Tokens (Time-based codes) None (Offline) Best for: ETO access to Engineering Workstations.
Local Auth Server LAN Only Best for: Fleet-wide identity management on newbuilds.
ETO Implementation Checklist
Mandatory Remote MFA

Ensure that any OEM or shore-side support connecting via the ZTNA gateway is forced to use MFA. No exceptions.

Hardware Redundancy

For every primary hardware key (Yubikey), a backup key must be stored in the ship’s safe. If the ETO loses their key mid-voyage, access must be recoverable.

Advisor Tip: On older vessels that do not support MFA natively, use a “Jump Server” approach. The ETO logs into a secured Windows box with MFA, and from there they can access the legacy PLCs using traditional passwords.

Next Security Phase

Crew Changeover & Identity Handover

Crew Changeover & Identity Handover Regulatory Context: IACS UR E27 (Section 4.2.1) mandates that every user must be uniquely identified. This module outlines the procedure for the revocation of access for departing personnel and the provisioning of ...

Continue to Crew Changeover & Identity Handover →
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